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The paper studies the equilibrium value of bid-ask spreads and time-
to-trade in a continuous-time, intermediated ﬁnancial market. The en-
dogenous spreads are the price at which brokers are willing to oﬀer im-
mediacy. In case intermediaries pay trading costs, it includes them too.
We determine equilibrium trading policies, returns and liquidity premium.
Both intervention barriers and intervention times are endogenous. The pa-
per predicts spreads and times between successive trades increasing with
the diﬀerence in agents’ risk attitudes. The impact is one order of magni-
tude bigger. Bid-ask prices and trading barriers react asymetrically to an
increase in the diﬀerence of risk aversions. They are symmetric in trading
costs. We show that competition among brokers does not drive the spread
to zero unless investors are risk-neutral.
It is well known that trading behavior in ﬁnancial markets is aﬀected by
its costs. The impact of trading costs is considered so important that current
policy discussion and interventions aim at increasing costs - through taxes - in
order to reduce trading frequency and possibly price volatility. Costs arise from
a number of sources. A non-exhaustive list includes participation costs, such as
infrastructure or access costs, information, search and execution costs, among
which taxes play a role. To put it simply, trading costs can be either faced by
single market participants, who meet in a competitive marketplace, or absorbed
by an intermediary, who then stands ready to absorb any order from the rest
of the market. In the second case, he provides also the service of immediacy, or
immediate liquidity. He is expected to charge a fee for this service, on top of
being reimbursed of the costs he absorbs. His bid-ask spread will include both
of them.
The way in which trading costs aﬀect equilibrium asset prices in the compet-
itive case, as well as the way in which they interact with the price for immediacy
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1in the intermediated case, is not easy to assess. Consider rational investors who
maximize their lifetime utility. As soon as there is a source of risk which aﬀects
their wealth, together with direct trading costs or intermediary spreads, their
behavior departs from the benchmark we all have in mind (à la Merton). It
involves no-trading regions and inertia. To endogenize the price dynamics and
- if possible - the time at which trade occurs is a challenging task. In spite of
the related modelling and computational diﬃculties, there has recently been a
surge of interest in the topic.
Up to the best of our knowledge, decentralized models have successfully
addressed asset pricing and trade frequency in the presence of trading costs,
both when investors have the same risk aversion (Vayanos (1998), Lo, Mamaysky
and Wang (2004)), and when they do not (Buss and Dumas (2012)). They have
investigated the eﬀect of trading costs on prices and turnover. Since trading
is competitive, there is no price of immediacy: agents share exogenous trading
costs. While in Vayanos’ view costs have a small eﬀect on prices, since the
trading frequency is reduced drastically with respect to a frictionless situation,
Lo et al. point at a more signiﬁcant eﬀect of costs on equilibrium prices. Buss
and Dumas go even further. They use the assessed eﬀect on prices and trade
to produce a cost-adjusted CAPM and to explain some empirical asset pricing
puzzles.
Centralized trading with trading costs is relevant too, given the growing im-
portance of over-the counter markets, which are often intermediated. Models of
centralized trading with endogenous bid-ask spreads - which in turn incorporate
trading costs - do exist. These models have concentrated mostly on a speciﬁc
source of costs, namely search costs, in the presence of asymmetric informa-
tion, and on outside options, i.e. the possibility of trading both directly and
through intermediaries (Duﬃe, Gârleanu and Pedersen (2005, 2007)). They are
not interested in trade frequency, which is instead one of our main concerns.
This paper aims at ﬁlling a small gap in the literature, by focussing on cen-
tralized trading and providing both endogenous spreads and infrequent trading.
Trading costs are not limited to search costs. Actually, our starting point is the
case in which there are no costs at all, but still the intermediary - or broker
- deserves a fee for the service of immediacy (on top of any information pre-
mium, which we do not model). We expect the existence of equilibrium bid-ask
spreads - as well as their magnitude - and the ensuing trade frequency to depend
on the diﬀerence between the risk attitude of demand and supply of immediacy
(investors and broker) and on trading costs.
The paper is expected to enhance the comprehension of the price and trade
impact of strategic brokers’ behavior. It does so with respect to the traditional
microstructure literature, as exempliﬁed by the seminal models in intermedi-
aries’ pricing, such as Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1981). In terms of prices, this
literature - based on brokers’ inventories and risk aversion - forecasted higher
ask and lower bid prices with higher broker’s risk aversion. It did not capture
the interaction between the risk attitude of intermediaries and customers, for
the simple reason that it took the behavior of customers as given. An exception
is Pagano and Roell (1989), which - in a more stylized setting - proves that
2brokers trade only with customers more risk averse than themselves. In terms
of trade, the literature often assumes that traders arrive according to a Poisson
process, whose intensity is an exogenously-assigned function of spreads.
A preview of our results is as follows: we conﬁrm the intuition about the
importance of diﬀerent risk aversions - with the broker less risk averse than
his customer - in justifying the existence and magnitude of spreads, as well as
infrequent trade. Spreads, intervention barriers and the frequency of trade are
determined simultaneously in equilibrium. They are null only if the investor is
risk neutral. We also determine equilibrium returns, which depend on transac-
tion costs and diﬀer for long and short positions, and liquidity premia, which
are increasing in the diﬀerence between risk aversions. Bid and ask prices are
very sensitive to risk-aversion diﬀerences: the impact of the ﬁrst on the second
is one order of magnitude bigger. Also, spreads do not react symmetrically to
discrepancies in risk attitudes and generate a bias towards cash. Spreads and
the expected time between portfolio re-adjustments - as well as liquidity premia
- are increasing in the costs suﬀered by the intermediary, in a symmetric way.
Competition among brokers does not wash spreads - and consequently trade
inertia - away.
In order to study equilibrium bid-ask spreads we go back to the simplest
framework for investors’ choices in continuous-time stochastic economies with
costly trading, characterized by a risky and a riskless asset, together with inﬁ-
nitely lived, power utility agents. We assume that a representative investor faces
a single broker, or specialist, who sets the spreads. We motivate the optimiza-
tion conditions of the latter - which extend the usual smooth-pasting ones - and
reduce the equilibrium conditions to four numerical equations. We comment
on the corresponding equilibrium bid and ask prices and traded quantities. We
verify that the equilibrium conditions have no solution if the bid-ask spread is
null, unless the investor is risk neutral. We show numerically that, if the risk
aversion of the agents is diverse, with brokers less risk averse than investors,
an equilibrium exists. In this equilibrium, all others equal, trade occurs more
frequently than in the corresponding transaction cost model with partial equi-
librium (Constantinides (1986), Dumas-Luciano (1991)). We present our model
and results ﬁrst for the case in which there are no trading costs, then in the
presence of trading costs. Opposite to diﬀerences in risk aversion, trading costs
generate symmetric eﬀects on bid/ask prices and barriers.
At a second stage, we study a market with heterogeneous brokers instead of
a single specialist, and show that the second will always prevail. His welfare will
be reduced according to the competition he fears, measured by the probability
that he assigns to investors visiting his competitor.
Last, we compare with both the traditional, inventory and risk—aversion-
based literature on brokers’ pricing, and with the more recent, search-cost based
one.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 1 sets up the model. Section
2 studies the optimization conditions for the two types of agents (investors and
specialist). Section 3 deﬁnes the equilibrium and studies its returns and liq-
uidity premia. Section 4 rules out the existence of equilibria in which spreads
3vanish. Section 5 provides numerical examples of equilibria and studies the cor-
responding market features (spreads, trading policy, transaction frequency, rate
of growth of expected utility, their sensitivity to the specialist’s risk aversion),
in comparison to partial equilibrium models. It covers also the case of trading
costs for the broker. Section 6 studies the case of competitive brokers. Section 7
compares with the inventory-based and OTC literature. Section 8 summarizes
and concludes.
1S e t u p
We consider a continuous-time stochastic economy in which two assets are
traded: a riskless and a risky one. The interest rate  on the riskless asset
is not determined endogenously, since there is no intermediate consumption.
The pre-bid, pre-ask price of the risky asset - its fundamental value, which de-
scribes its dividends - is a geometric Brownian motion with parameters  and
. Two agents populate our economy: a representative investor and a specialist.
The investor maximizes the expected utility of his terminal wealth, E(()).
He has an inﬁnite-horizon power utility, ()=. Unless otherwise spec-







For each dollar value of risky security he trades with the intermediary, the in-
vestor receives a bid price  a n dp a y sa na s kp r i c e1, which will be constrained
to be respectively smaller and greater than - or at most equal to - one: (01].
We will call the diﬀerences 1 − 1 − 1 the transaction costs, in order to dis-
tinguish them from the actual trading costs, which impinge on the broker only.
The investor takes as given the transaction costs, as well as the risk-return fea-
tures of the risky asset. Let () and () be the values of his riskless and risky
position1.H i sﬁnal wealth is their liquidation value, i.e. ()=()+().
The investor’ s optimization problem has been ﬁrst solved by Dumas and
Luciano (1991) and Gerhold, Guasoni, Muhle-Karbe and Schachermayer (2011),
respectively for non-inﬁnitesimal and inﬁnitesimal-spread cases. It is shown in
both papers that - if  is the standard Brownian motion which drives  -t h e r e
exist two increasing processes  and  which make the value of the investor’s
assets evolve according to
½
()=() + () − ()
()=() + ()()+() − () (2)
The processes  and  increase only when  =  the ratio of risky to riskless
asset in portfolio, reaches respectively a lower and an upper barrier, which we
denote as  and . In most of what follows, for the sake of simplicity, we restrict
1Later on  will be called also the pre-spread price: indeed, we do not need to distinguish
prices and values.
4our formulas to parameter combinations which make both barriers positive2, i.e.
0  . To this end, we restrict the parameters so that the optimal asset
holdings would be positive in the absence of transaction costs:
0 
 − 
(1 − )2  1 (3)
We know that asset holdings with bid-ask spreads include the optimal holdings
in the corresponding frictionless market, 
∗  , where the optimal ratio 
∗







(1 − )2 −  + 
With trading frictions, the ratio is not kept at 
∗, but the high frequency of
trading needs imposed by the inﬁnite variation of the underlying fundamental
price  remains.
The specialist pays to the investor the returns on the risky asset3 and stands
ready to absorb all the transactions required by the investor. He charges a bid
and an ask price for this, i.e. he sets  and . Both the risky and riskless asset
are in zero net supply. If  and  are the specialist’s asset holdings, this
implies  = −,  = −. Also the specialist aims at maximizing the utility
of his ﬁnal wealth4. He is assumed to have an inﬁnite horizon and to be a
power-utility agent. If not speciﬁed otherwise, we assume that he is risk-averse,
1 − 0  0.I n t h e ﬁrst part of the paper we assume that he does not incur
external or actual costs of trading, such as participation, information, search
and execution costs. This means that the dynamics of his assets is
½
 =  −  + 
 =  +  − +  (4)
while his ﬁnal wealth is  +  = − − . Later on, we consider external costs
of trading5, as in Vayanos (1998), Lo et al. (2004), Buch and Dumas (2012),
Duﬃe et al. (2005, 2007). We assume that they are proportional to trade. Since
these costs are not pocketed by the specialist, they can be modelled by keeping
 and  in the investor’s SDEs (2) and inserting 0   0 in the specialist’s
ones (4). The broker’s ﬁnal wealth becomes  +( 0 − ) = − − (0 − )
2The computations for the other cases, which were used for the numerical implementations,
can be obtained from the Author upon request.
3In this sense, the risky asset can be interpreted as in Buss and Dumas: it entitles the
investor to receive his risky endowment.
4We rule out constraints on his wealth. In particular, we rule out the possibility of default
of the intermediary.
5Vayanos and Lo et al. call these costs "transaction costs", while we call them "trading"
or "external" costs and use the terminology "transaction costs" for the diﬀerence between
the bid or ask and its reference price.
52 Optimization
2.1 Optimization for the investor
The optimization problem of the investor is well understood in the literature.
We review it here for one simple reason: we want to stress that its solution
boils down to solving an algebraic equation only. Indeed, it is known that, with
positive risk aversion, problem (1) under (2) reduces to solving for the function
 the ODE











00()=(  − 1)0()
00()=(  − 1)0()

















if there exists a constant  -a na r t i ﬁcial discount rate - which makes  itself,





and, given the homotheticity of the utility function, we assume ()= ().
It has also been shown that a solution technique for the above problem
consists of three steps. First, we recognize that a candidate solution for the
value function is either
()=
− [( ln()) + ( ln())] (8)




6where6 ABR 12 =  ± 
  =(  − )2 − 12 (12)
  =




and   =  − .
Second, we substitute both the ﬁrst and second order BCs into the ODE, so
as to obtain a second degree equation for the optimal barriers  and , through
their transforms  and . These are respectively the smaller and the bigger
root of the following equation:
 +  ( − ) +  ( − 1)222=0 (14)
whose discriminant we denote as ∆ :
∆  = 2( − )2 − 2( − 1)2 (15)
Third, we make the determinant of the value matching BCs, once written in
terms of (8) or (9), and considered as equations in () or (AB),e q u a lt o
zero. This guarantees that the value function is non-null and stationary. The
determinant is equated to zero by a proper choice of the artiﬁcial discount rate
,v i a. This means solving for  the algebraic equation
()() − ()()=0 (16)
where - in the trigonometric or imaginary case7 - the expressions for  are
()=( − − )( ln()) + ( ln())
()=( − − )( ln()) − ( ln())
()=( − − )( ln()) + ( ln())
()=( − − )( ln()) − ( ln())
(17)
The solution requires substitution of the expressions for   in terms of
the parameters − and  itself. The solutions for  which are acceptable are
the ones which make  and  real, i.e. which render ∆ non-negative. For the
case of negative (positive) , a straightforward computation shows that ∆ ≥ 0
as long as  ≤ (≥)




2( − 1)2 (18)




 −  − 22
2
22  (10)




 −  − 22

 +  =0 (11)
has complex solutions in the ﬁrst case, real in the second.
7The corresponding expressions for the hyperbolic or real case are similar, with the sines
and cosines to be interpreted as hyperbolic ones, and appropriate diﬀerences in signs.
72.2 Optimization for the specialist
Let  be the specialist’s value function, i.e.
lim
→∞








where  is his wealth,  =  +  = − − . It is easy to show, as in the
investor’s case, that, if we aim at a stationary value function, we must discount
 at a rate 
0  = 0 − 
0.W e c a n d e ﬁne the discounted value function
( ;)=−0(−)( ;) and assume lim→∞ ( ;)=
( )=−
0





 ()+(  − )0

















12 =  ± 0
0  =





As in the investor’s case, the constant 
0 satisﬁes
0()0() − 0()0()=0 (21)
where8
0()=( − − 0)(0 ln()) + 0(0 ln())
0()=( − − 0)(0 ln()) − 0(0 ln())
0()=( − − 0)(0 ln()) + 0(0 ln())
0()=( − − 0)(0 ln()) − 0(0 ln())







where the  are the ones deﬁned above (and decided by the investor).
However, since it can be shown that the function  cannot be maximized
with respect to  on the whole domain, but at most for speciﬁc choices of ,o n
top of the value matching BCs we do not have the (traditional) smooth pasting
ones. We need to develop new maximization conditions. The natural choices are
the FOCs with respect to  and , in which the broker takes into consideration
8Here too we report the trigonometric case only.
8the investor’s reaction to his choice of the spreads. These conditions are obtained
from (22), diﬀerentiating with respect to  and , i.e. computing
½ 
 [−0 ()+(  + )
0()] = 0

 [(1 + )
0() − 0()]=0
By doing so, we obtain the "modiﬁed" smooth pasting conditions9
( 
 [(1 − 0)







00()+( 1− 0)ˆ  0()
i
− 0()+ˆ  0()=0
(23)
I nt h el a s ts y s t e mw eh a v et h ed e r i v a t i v e so ft h eb o u n d a r i e sw i t hr e s p e c tt ot h e
costs, 
 
 which must be obtained from the investor’s problem solution.
Indeed, from the deﬁnition of  and , namely (6) and (7), together with (14),










 = ( − 1)2 (25)
 = −( − ) −
√
∆ (26)
0 =  +2
√
∆ (27)
B a s e do nt h e m ,d e p e n d e n c eo f on  and  on  acts both directly and via the
discount rate  (which equates the determinant of the value matching conditions



























































9It can also be demonstrated that an equilibrium in which dealers do not take the reaction
of their counterpart into consideration does not exist.
9where the derivatives of  are easily obtained in closed form. Substituting
for (22) and (23) into the ODE for the specialist at  and , one gets the following
algebraic equations, which synthesize the value matching and "modiﬁed" smooth
pasting conditions for the specialist:




































Obviously, the derivatives of the barriers obtained in (28), (29) - together with
(30) and (31) - have to be substituted in (32) and (33) before solving them.
3 Equilibrium





,w i t h ∈
(01]2,s u c ht h a t
• the investor’s maximization problem is solved
• the specialist’s one is solved too
and the barriers  and  are real, i.e.  ≤ (≥)
∗ if ()0.S i n c e , b y
deﬁnition, the specialist absorbs any trading need of the investor, we do not
need to worry about matching demand and supply of the risky and riskless
asset. Overall, an equilibrium of the previous market requires that the four
algebraic equations (16), (21), (32), (33) - which we report here for the sake




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 −  =0
00 − 00 =0
































Equilibrium prices and quantities are as follows.
Prices: the procedure we follow consists in verifying that the pre bid, pre-
ask geometric Brownian motion price speciﬁed above is indeed a fundamental
value11. Consistently with the stationary nature of the problem, agents trade
10For given  −  20 the investors’ problem is solved once  is found, while the
specialist’s one is solved once 0 are.
11We do not have enough structure to determine asset prices via stochastic discount factors.
In this sense the process  is not a standard equilibrium price, but a fundamental value
or cumulated dividend process. As such it appears in the individuals’ budget constraints.
Investors are willing to pay for an asset its stream of dividends adjusted for the bid or ask
spread (depending on whether they sell or buy). This makes our set-up consistent with Lo et
al., who fully work out the corresponding competitive equilibrium.
10either at a constant discount on it, given by the bid price  (which applies at
the upper barrier), or at a surcharge on it, given by the ask price 1 (at the
lower barrier). The fundamental value is never observed as a trading price,
while  and  are. They can be observed only when trade occurs, though.
Indeed, there are two diﬀerent trading prices. When trade occurs because the
investor reached his upper barrier, and needs to sell the risky asset, the cum-bid
price  is the observed trading price; when trade occurs at the lower investor’s
barrier, the cum-ask price  is the observed trading price. Both prices are
reduced (substantially reduced, as we will see in numerical examples) because
of transaction costs  and , even in the absence of trading costs. This is in the
spirit of Amihud and Mendelson (1986). The ensuing bid-ask spread (per unit
value of the underlying) 1 −  is going to represent the equilibrium price of
immediacy.
Quantities:i ti sk n o w nt h a t and  are the local times of the process 
at  respectively: trade per unit of time is inﬁnitesimal, with inﬁnite total
and ﬁnite quadratic variation. This is consistent with the ﬁndings in Buss and
Dumas (2012) for a competitive market in which the endowment evolves as a
binomial tree: both transaction prices and trades have inﬁnite total and ﬁnite
quadratic variation. Observed trade is not continuous in time, but infrequent.
3.1 Returns and liquidity premia
Starting from trading prices, we can compute the appropriate returns and the
liquidity premium.
In order to compute returns, suppose that the investor just bought the
risky asset at the ask (percentage) price 1. Considering that inside the no-
transaction region returns on  accrue with instantaneous drift  − 22 and














 + ()+l n ( )  = 
where  is the ﬁrst time  hits the barrier , starting from  at 0. In case














 + () − ln()  = 
where  is the ﬁrst time  hits , starting from  at 0.
The ﬁrst, obvious remark on returns is that they collapse to the usual ones
when  =  =1 , i.e. when we have no transaction costs. In this case the
geometric Brownian nature of the fundamental value holds, and returns are
Gaussian with the due expected value and variance. When we consider returns
per unit of time, the impact of transaction costs is lower the higher is the return
horizon.
11The second remark is that - if the same  and  apply to a frictionless
economy, where  =  =1 , and to an economy with positive spreads - returns
up to the ﬁrst hitting time of the opposite barrier ( or )a r et h es a m ea si n
the frictionless case if  =1 , i.e. if the bid and ask prices are symmetric,
 =1 . This result seems to be in contrast with the well-known result of Ami-
hud and Mendelson (1986), which is supported by a large empirical evidence,
and predicts expected returns increasing (and concave) in the bid-ask spread.
However, the equilibrium we are describing is not welfare-preserving with re-
spect to a corresponding frictionless economy. On the contrary, as the reader
can guess from the monopolistic role of the broker, and as we will verify in the
base-numerical case to follow, for given parameter values  and  the investor’s
welfare is smaller than in a frictionless equilibrium. In order to reconcile our re-
turns’ features with the traditional theory one should compare the above returns




where ∗ and ∗2 are welfare preserving
with respect to  and 12.
The third remark is that the expected returns derived from the above ex-
pressions collapse into Amihud and Mendelson’s spread-adjusted returns if one
normalizes the ask price - as they do - and computed discrete instead of log
returns. However, we do not obtain returns concave in the spread, since here
the spread is endogenous.







2,a n dt a k ei t sd i ﬀerence with respect to the funda-




+  − 2
is the equilibrium liquidity premium. It vanishes when transaction costs do - i.e.
 =  =1- while it goes to inﬁnity when ask and bid prices reach respectively
their maximum and minimum, i.e.  → 0→ 0.
4 No bid-ask spread case
Intuitively, one does not expect an equilibrium of the above type to exist, unless
transaction costs are positive at least on one side. Indeed, we do not expect the
broker to provide immediacy for free, by setting the bid and ask price equal to
the fundamental price,  =  =1 . We can envisage an exception, though: the
broker could accept zero fees, if he does not need to intervene! We expect an
equilibrium without costs to exist only if the investor is someway "autonomous".
Since we know that - without transaction costs - the no-trade barriers collapse
to the optimal Merton’s holding, 
∗ and that this holding is -1 for risk-neutral
investors, we can actually verify that the intuition is correct.
We aim at proving that the system (34) admits no solution when  =  =1 
and consequently  =  = 
∗,u n l e s s =1 . The proof is as follows. Since
12The conditions for preserving welfare were discussed in a previous version of the paper
and can be obtained from the Author upon request.
12the value functions do not solve exactly the boundary value problems outlined
above, the ﬁrst two equilibrium conditions in (34) do not determine the rates

0 any more. At  = 
∗ = −

























































They can be solved at the same time if and only if the ratio of the barrier’s

































































(1 − )2 −  + 
 − 
It is easy to show that the previous equality - under mild technical conditions
on the derivatives of  -i ss a t i s ﬁed when  → 1, i.e. when the investor
is risk neutral, since both sides tend to -1. We indeed know that in this case is
optimal investment allocation 
∗ →− 1, and he does not need an intermediary
to optimally balance his wealth.
5E x a m p l e s
The equilibrium conditions provided above cannot be solved explicitly. We
discuss them starting from a base case, which is calibrated to the pioneering
literature in single investor’s optimality with transaction costs (Constantinides
(1986)). In section 5.1 we obtain the equilibrium quadruple in the base case
and discuss the resulting transaction policy, expected time to next trade and
rate of growth of derived utility, in comparison with their out-of-equilibrium (or
investor-only) values. In Section 5.2 we discuss the impact of the diﬀerence in
risk aversions on the results.
135.1 Base case
Starting from the assets’ risk-return base case in Constantinides (1986), i.e.
 −  =5 % 2 =4 % , we assume a coeﬃcient of risk aversion for the investor
equal to 1 −  =4 , and a broker’s risk aversion slightly smaller: 1 − 0 =3 85.
5.1.1 Costs and barriers
This section shows that
• spreads are one order of magnitude bigger than the (percentage) diﬀerence
in risk aversion which justiﬁes them. Partial equilibrium models were
unable to capture such a magniﬁed eﬀect of risk aversion heterogeneity.
We simply had no expectation on this order of magnitude. The result
we obtain reconciles low heterogeneity in risk aversion - which seems to
be an empirically relevant phenomenon - with reasonable levels of trade
frequency (close to weeks or months, not to years or decades);
• the no-trade region presents a bias toward cash. This bias does not depend
on consumption-on-the way. It just depends on the bigger sensitivity of
ask prices with respect to risk-aversion diﬀerence.






with barriers equal to
 =0 301825 
∗ =0 480013
since the corresponding no-cost problem has optimal portfolio mix

∗ =0 4545
The investor-only problem - keeping the exogenous costs at the level provided
in equilibrium, for the sake of comparison - gives barriers equal to14
 =0 1495 
∗   =0 8243
while the discount rate  becomes 00192.W eu s et h en o t a t i o n for "partial"
equilibrium values.
Let us comment on the equilibrium bid/ask spread, returns and premium
ﬁrst. The equilibrium bid price is approximately equal to  =9 7 5% of the pre-
bid quote, the ask price is equal to 1 =1 684% = 146% of it. The bid and
13For the given parametrization,  =0 01125, ∗ =0 0234375.S i n c e b o t h  and 0 are
greater than , the roots of equation (11) - and its equivalent for the broker - are imaginary.
The transaction boundaries are real, since  ∗
14For the given parametrization,  =0 01125, ∗ =0 0234375. The investor’s problem
is solved by  =0 0192  , so that the roots of equation (11) - and its equivalent for the
broker - are imaginary. The transaction boundaries are real, since  ∗
14ask prices are not symmetric, since  6= . The bid-ask spread - or round-trip
cost - amounts to15 1 −  =4 8 5%. Expected returns per unit of time, in
excess of the risk-free rate, are
½
+003 − 037965   
+003 − 040466  = 
for a long position,
½
+003 + 0024774   
+003 + 040466  = 
for a short one.
Last but not least, the equilibrium liquidity premium is
 =1  +  − 2 = 44%
At i n yd i ﬀerence in risk aversion justiﬁes huge costs and a huge spread in equi-
librium. The latter is one order of magnitude bigger than the risk aversion
(percentage) diﬀerence. L i q u i d i t yi sv e r ym u c ha ﬀected too, with an increase
from its zero-cost value which is one order of magnitude bigger than the risk
aversion diﬀerence.
Let us see the eﬀects on the no-trade region. Quite surprisingly, even if
costs are kept the same when we analyze the investor-only decision, his barriers
are more distant than the equilibrium ones ( −  =0 15  −  =0 34).
The intervention barriers are further apart in the no-equilibrium than in the
equilibrium case, and its no-transaction cone incorporates the equilibrium one:
[insert here ﬁgure 1]
Overall, this means that previous, one-sided (or "partial", or no-equilibrium)
models, might have overstated the magnitude of no trade, even though they
perfectly captured the trading mechanism. With a specialist, the investor is
less reluctant to trade, since the specialist has forecasted his customer’s reaction
when ﬁxing the costs. In terms of optimal overall portfolio mix,a sm e a s u r e d
by the ratio of risky to total assets, (+), instead of being measured as the














15The bid-ask spread is not calibrated to empirically observed values, since we aim at
stressing how important a subtle diﬀerence in the risk aversion of market participants can be
in terms of price of immediacy.





As expected, even in terms of overall portfolio mix, the barriers are closer to the
no-cost situation in the equilibrium case. Both in terms of risky to riskless ratio
and overall portfolio mix, the percentage diﬀerences between the equilibrium and
the no- equilibrium (or partial equilibrium) situation are one order of magnitude
bigger than the risk aversion diﬀerence which justiﬁes them.
Another feature of the equilibrium is: the barriers of intervention of the
investor are less symmetric with respect to the optimal ratio in the absence of
costs, i.e. 
∗ =0 45, than without an intermediary. This results from the
comparison of the barriers

∗ −  =0 15− 
∗ =0 03

∗ −  =0 30  − 
∗ =0 37





























T h i sp e r m i t su st oc o m m e n to nt h ebias towards cash - the riskless asset -
which Constantinides found in the partial equilibrium model with consumption.
Later papers explained it by consumption itself - since it vanished with interim
consumption, unless the horizon is ﬁnite (Liu and Loewenstein (2002)). In
our case the bias comes back, even without interim consumption, since the
equilibrium magnitude of costs is not symmetric: ask prices are much bigger
than bid ones.
5.1.2 Trade frequency
The spread and no-trade region features produce trade frequencies which - all
others equal - are more realistic than partial equilibrium frequencies. Partial
equilibrium models then were overestimating the reduction in trade provided by
transaction costs. Still, trade is far from being continuous.
The frequency of trade can be measured by the expected time that the
process  takes in order to reach either the upper  or the lower barrier ,
starting from the optimal mix 
∗.B e t w e e n  and ,  has drift  =  − 
and diﬀusion . Standard results in the theory of the ﬁrst passage time of a
Brownian motion through either an upper or a lower boundary tell us that the


































16In the cum-specialist equilibrium just described, the expected time between
transactions is close to 6 months (∗ =0 508). A tiny diﬀerence in risk aversion
of the participants makes trade infrequent.
T h ee x p e c t e dt i m ew o u l db ec l o s et o1 3y e a r si nt h ec o r r e s p o n d i n gn o -
equilibrium case, since the barriers are more distant from the optimal one. A
ﬁrst remark on trade is then that partial equilibrium models à la Constantinides,
all others equal, were overestimating the impact on trade infrequency. On top
of that, while in partial equilibrium models we are able to assess only the eﬀect
of the investor’s risk aversion on trade frequency, here we will be able to assess
also the impact of the market-maker’s risk attitude (see Section 5.2).
A second remark is that the expected time between interventions is in any
case huge in comparison with the continuous trading of the frictionless litera-
ture. This is in line with what Constantinides aimed at showing, early in the
development of the transaction-cost literature.
5.1.3 Rate of growth of expected utility
We still need to verify that the rate of growth of expected utility moves in the
right direction when going from a non-intermediated market (or partial equilib-
rium) to an intermediated one. Let us comment on the last couple of equilibrium
parameters, namely  and 
0. They indeed determine the rate of growth of the
indirect utility of the investor and broker,  and 
0 respectively16.G i v e nt h a t
 =  − , the higher is  the smaller the rate of growth of the corresponding
agent. Analogously for 
0 Since  =2 34%   =1 92% t h ei n v e s t o r ’ sr a t eo f
growth of expected utility in the current equilibrium, ,i ss m a l l e rt h a ni nt h e
corresponding no-equilibrium. The presence of a (monopolistic) market maker
aﬀects this rate in the expected direction.
5.2 Sensitivity analysis
This section explores the spread, trade and welfare implications of changing the
participants’ risk aversion. By decreasing the risk aversion of the broker, we ﬁnd
equilibria characterized by lower  and , which means that bid prices decrease,
ask prices and the overall spread and transaction costs increase. Table one
below gives a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium bid prices,
 values, control or no-trade limits, expected time between interventions and
growth rates with respect to the broker’s risk aversion17.
16Recall that, since utility stays bounded when discounted at the rate ,i tg r o w sa t when
it is not artiﬁcially discounted.
17A similar analysis could be conducted by varying the volatility parameter .
17Table 1
1 − 0     ∗ 
0 
3.85 0.975 0.684 0.3018 0.4800 0.508 0.023687 0.023428
3.815 0.946 0.656 0.2869 0.4992 0.973 0.023824 0.023421
3.8 0.935 0.645 0.2811 0.5068 1.176 0.023892 0.023418
3.75 0.900 0.610 0.2644 0.5294 1.839 0.024166 0.023412
3.7 0.869 0.582 0.2530 0.5465 2.385 0.024506 0.023411
3.6 0.841 0.560 0.2435 0.5647 2.973 0.024904 0.02341
The bid-ask prices behavior - together with the liquidity premium one - is
presented in ﬁgure 2 below, as a function of the diﬀerence between the agents’
risk aversions, 0 − :
[insert here ﬁgure 2]
Both  and  decrease, at a similar rate. This has an asymmetric impact
on trading prices, since the bid price goes from 975% to 84%, while the ask
one goes from 1684% = 146% to 156% = 178%. The absolute diﬀerence
is approximately 13 percentage points in the ﬁrst case, 32 in the second18.
Consistently, the liquidity premium increases from less than 0.5 to close to 0.7.
As for trading barriers, since lower risk aversion for the broker entails in-
creases in transaction costs, the lower barrier  decreases, while the upper one
 goes up. In the plane  − , the cone of no-transactions, characterized by
 , becomes wider. Investors become more tolerant with respect to
discrepancies between their actual asset mix and the optimal, no-cost one, 
∗
Out of equilibrium, this happens as a result of an increase in the investor’s risk
aversion (see for instance Constantinides (1986))19. Here, even if the investor’s
attitude towards risk does not change, his counterpart’s decreased risk aversion
makes him more reluctant to trade, since his costs in doing so increase.
Figure 3 shows the behavior of the barriers as a function of the diﬀerence
between the specialist and investor’s risk aversion
[insert here ﬁgure 3]
The ﬁgure reports 
∗ too. By so doing, it puts into evidence the asymmetry,
or bias toward cash, when transaction costs increase. Going down the Table,
the lower barrier  departs from the optimal ratio without transaction costs,

∗ =0 4545, more than the upper one : the cone opens up more towards the
lower part and people tend to hold more cash than if the barriers opened in a
symmetric way. This eﬀect, which we noticed for the base case, is preserved
when costs increase because risk aversions depart. It is due to the interaction of
broker and investor, which makes costs on the ask side increase more than costs
18Also as a percentage of the initial price, we go from less than 14% to more than 22%
19They actually distinguish the eﬀect on the width of the region (diﬀerently measured) from
the eﬀect on the positioning of the barriers. Here we focus on the second.
18on the bid side. It is the eﬀect on trade of the greater sensitivity of ask with
respect to bid prices, and of the behavior of the liquidity premium. It follows
from the sensitivity of  and  with respect to the diﬀerence in risk aversions,
visualized in Figure 2.
The frequency of trade adjusts according to the barriers’ movement: the
expected time to the ﬁrst intervention ∗ goes up from 6 months to 3 years
when risk aversion of the broker decreases.
All the observations on trade barriers, bias toward cash and frequency can be
made with reference to the overall portfolio mix, instead of the risky-to-riskless
ratio. Figure 4 below presents the lower and upper mix as a function of the
diﬀerence in agent’s risk aversion, together with the optimal mix without costs.
[insert here ﬁgure 4]
The r a t e so fg r o w t ho fi n d i r e c tu t i l i t ymove too:  slightly decreases, while 
0
increases when risk aversion of the broker decreases. This means that  = −
slightly increases. The adjustment of trade - i.e., the opening up of the no-
transaction region between  and  - is so large as to make the whole rate of
growth of utility go up. This conﬁrms the no-equilibrium results of the literature,
which emphasized the impact of costs on assets’ demand. It provides a further
perspective on trade adjustment: not only intervention is rare in time, but such
policy is so eﬀective that it may make the whole rate of growth of utility increase
even when transaction costs go up20.
5.3 Case with external costs
We now focus on an equilibrium in which brokers impose the bid-ask spread
represented by  to their counterpart, but suﬀer external costs of trading.
This increases their cash outﬂow for each unit of risky asset bought from  to
0  , while - for any unit of cash inﬂow - it modiﬁes the value of the risky
asset sale to 0  We assume that the ratio 00 is symmetric and equal
to 1.




equations similar to the base-case ones, in which the brokers’ costs
have been updated:
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
 −  =0




































20The opposite could happen for the broker: when his risk aversion decreases, 0 could
decreases. This would mean that, in spite of applying higher costs, he suﬀers in terms of
utility growth, because investors do not visit him very often. Since  is not speciﬁed, though,
we do not know whether the broker’s utility does cumulate at a higher or lower rate 0.I t
is interesting to notice that the two rates tend to coincide when risk aversions do (i.e., when
1 − 0 → 4)as one expects. Recall though that when the spread disappears equilibrium
vanishes (since  6=1 ).















Using the same asset parameters as in the base case, namely − =5 % 2 =
4%, and keeping the investor’s risk aversion at 1 −  =4 ,a si nt h a tc a s e ,w e
explored the equilibrium for a number of possible impacts of external costs. We
found that no equilibrium exists for 1−0 =3 8,w h e n ranges from 101 to 2.
The tentative conclusion from this exploration is that, if the broker must use his
spread in order to cover external costs, this will aﬀect very heavily is policy: for
a wide rage of external costs, starting from a situation in which the agents’ risk
aversion is such as to have spreads already quite high without external costs,
he will not trade at all. Remember that - all others equal but without external
costs - the bid price was  = 93%, while  = 64% with a bid-ask spread of
1 −  = 62%. Here there is no equilibrium - if external costs go from 1 to
100% of the margin on each side, i.e. from 2 to 200% on both sides.
Knowing that - without external costs - equilibria with moderate bid-ask
spread exist when the risk aversions of the two agents are closer - the investor’s
one being still bigger than his broker’s - we explored the case in which the two
diﬀer by 1%, instead of 5%, i.e. 1 − 0 =3 96.A s s o o n a s t h e r i s k a v e r s i o n
diﬀerence is such as to produce moderate transaction costs in the absence of
external costs (as it happens when 0 → ), we found equilibria also with
external costs, even for high trading costs. All others equal, we considered
several levels of external costs , between 20 and 26%. We found that  goes
from 996 to 99%,  from 637 to 60%.
These equilibria provide us with new information. They are able to tell us
how the price of immediacy grows when the intermediary suﬀers external costs.
They have a bid-ask spread monotonic in the magnitude of external costs, as
expected. In the range examined, the bid-ask spread goes from 57.4% to 67.7%.
The liquidity premium goes from 56.6% to 65.7%. The lower trading barriers go
from 0.247 to 0.228, while the upper ones range from 0.537 to 0.550: the cone
opens up symmetrically. There is no asymmetry or bias towards cash generated
by an increase in costs. Only the initial distance from the optimal ratio 
∗ is
bigger for the lower than for the upper barrier. The expected time to next trade
ranges from 2.22 to 2.82 years.
Our results are close - even in order of magnitude - to the ones of the equi-
librium model of Lo et al. (2004). The latter involves competitive trade with
external trading costs, and is able to generate long intervals between successive
trade, as well as large no-trading regions. In their case the reason is the presence
of ﬁxed costs, while here is intermediated trade. As we will argue in the con-
clusions too, the diﬀerence between the two models which leads to same order
of magnitude in eﬀects seems to point to two possible, rational interpretations
of observed high liquidity premia and low trade.
206 Competition among brokers
We argued above that, with or without external costs, the more a broker is risk
averse, i.e. closer in risk aversion to his customer, the more his prices will be
advantageous for the latter. However, when the brokers’ risk aversion goes up,
trade increases. The increase in trade is so strong that the utility growth rate
of the investor goes down. Overall, as our intuition about risk sharing would
suggest, investors will be attracted by the less risk averse counterpart, i.e. the
one with risk aversion more distant from their own. As an immediate conse-
quence, in the presence of two types of broker’s, with diﬀerent risk aversions,
all the agents will trade with the less risk averse one, since he his the one with
risk aversion further from their own. Ex post, only monopolistic brokers - or
specialists - can play in a market with the characteristics listed so far.
Ex ante, though, we can imagine a situation in which the monopolistic role
of the specialist is mitigated by imperfect information. He knows he has a
competitor, but he does not know whether the risk aversion of the latter —
w h i c hw ed e n o t ea s1 − - is greater or smaller than his own. Denote with 
the probability distribution that he attaches to his competitor’s parameter .
If  will turn out to be greater than 0, all trade will go to the competitor, and
vice-versa. A priori, the specialist will receive no trade request with probability
1 − (0); he will receive all trade with probability (0).
It is possible to write down the specialist’s problem in terms of the following









 ()2+(1 − (0)) ()=0
(36)
where  is the broker’s utility function when no customer goes to him. Since










with  =  as in the previous sections. This ODE is subject to the same BCs
as in Section 2.2, so that  is still of the type
()=
− [0(0 ln()) + 0(0 ln())] (38)
where  is as deﬁned above, but
0  =










0 must render the determinant of the linear system in 00 null.
The determinant is still 0()0()−0()0()=0 ,w h o s ee n t r i e si n v o l v e
the new 0. This means that the problem of the specialist remains unaltered,
apart from the change of  into 0
Also the equilibrium conditions and the numerical examples and sensitivity
provided above remain untouched, with the proviso that the numerical results
21for 
0 now represent 
0 −1+(0). To obtain the new 
0,w em u s ta d dt ot h e m
the probability of receiving no trade request, 1 − (0). All others equal, the
greater is such probability, i.e. the smaller is the new rate of growth of derived
utility, 
0 
7 Brokers’ literature and its implications: a com-
parison
For the purpose of this paper, we distinguished two strands in the broker’s pric-
ing literature. The ﬁrst is the traditional, inventory-based approach to broker’s
pricing, which dates back to Garman (1976), Stoll (1978), Ho and Stoll (1981),
and is nicely summarized in O’Hara (1997). As in our description, the main
role of brokers in this literature is the provision of immediacy. The other is
the information or valuation-based literature, mostly its recent extension to de-
centralized ﬁnancial markets and endogenous trading frictions (Duﬃe et al.
2005, 2007).
7.1 Inventory-based models
The main modelling diﬀerence between our approach and the inventory-related
one is the fact that we provide equilibrium results, while customers’ arrival in
inventory models is usually an exogenous process, with demand inversely related
to the magnitude of costs. Customers’ behavior is not explicitly modelled. As
a consequence, the impact of a change in the bid-ask spread is an exogenous as-
sumption, instead of being endogenized as commanded by our modiﬁed smooth
pasting conditions.
In terms of modelling predictions, we may perform six comparisons.
First, the bid and ask prices usually depend on the level of inventories, even
when, as in Ho and Stoll (1981), their diﬀerence - the bid-ask spread - does not.
The former result holds in our case too, since the equilibrium conditions from
which  and  are determined involve the investor’s trading barriers  and ,
and consequently the after-trade percentage asset holdings, or inventories, of the
broker. Both prices are still decreasing with inventories. However, in our case
also the bid-ask spread 1− depends on inventories. This comes as no surprise:
in models such as Ho and Stoll, inventories disappeared as determinants of
the spread, while being determinants of its components, the prices, because of
symmetry and linearity assumptions in the demand by investors. O’Hara (1997)
already anticipated that independence of the spread from the level of inventories
was not very intuitive, and could probably be overcome while relaxing another
assumption in the model, namely the presence of a constant fundamental - or
pre-spread - value for the underlying good21. Our model has no symmetry
and linearity assumptions as concerns demand, which is endogenized. More
21All others equal, she claims that "the movement of a ﬁx e ds p r e a da r o u n dt h et r u ep r i c e
may no longer be optimal if the price itself is moving".
22than that, and consistently with O’Hara’s intuition, our equilibrium builds on a
non-constant fundamental value, the geometric Brownian motion which He and
Leland (1993) proved to be the pre-spread equilibrium for power investors. The
equilibrium determines not only the bid and ask prices, but also their diﬀerence
and inventories. As a result of this joint determination, even in the absence
of trading costs, Table 1 shows that the bid price  is countermonotonic with
respect to the upper trading barrier : the higher is the broker inventory, the
lower is his bid price. The ask price 1 is countermonotonic in the lower barrier
: the higher is the broker inventory, the lower is his ask price. An elementary
computation shows that the bid-ask spread 1− goes from 9444%to 4953%
when the broker’s minimum inventory () goes up, while the maximum one ()
goes down, i.e. when the maximum excursion in inventories goes down.
Second, most of the inventory models, such as the Ho and Stoll one, have
the ask price increasing and the bid one decreasing with the intermediary’s risk
aversion. Table 1 shows that in our case the opposite holds: as risk aversion
increases, 1 decreases while  increases. This happens because here the diﬀer-
ence in risk aversion between the two counterparts matters. In most traditional
models, starting from Stoll (1978), as well as in our set-up, inventories enter
the utility function of the broker, so that his risk aversion has a primary role.
However, in our equilibrium also the investor’s risk aversion - which was out of
the picture in out-of-equilibrium models - enters. As a result, in our model the
ask price 1 decreases and the bid one  increases - thus reducing the bid-ask
spread - as the broker’s risk aversion goes up and the investor’s one remains
ﬁxed, i.e. as the diﬀerence between their risk aversions goes down (from 4 to
15 in Table 1).
Third and most important, in all the equilibria in Table 1 brokers are less
risk averse than their customers. The spread - but also trade - vanishes when
the two risk aversion converge (going upwards in Table 1). The importance of
the diﬀerence between the risk attitudes of market makers and investors had
already been pointed out by Pagano and Roell (1989), who, in a quite diﬀerent
set-up, showed that brokers would never trade with customers less risk averse
than themselves. In Pagano and Roell’s set up, brokers set the bid-ask price
competitively, by equating the utility they get with and without operating as
brokers. Investors equate the utility they get when selling (buying) in a brokers’
market with the one they get when selling (buying) in a competitive market,
i.e. an auction or limit-order one. When customers are more risk averse than
brokers, the possibility of trading depends also on the spread which would prevail
on a competitive market and on the probability of ﬁnding a counterpart in it.
When trade occurs in the brokers’ market, the spread magnitude depends on
the diﬀerence between the risk attitudes of brokers and investors, exactly as in
our setting.
Fourth, a main diﬀerence between our model and traditional inventory ones
is the lack of mean reversion in the inventory level of the broker and in cum-
spread prices. Some inventory-based models do indeed determine a preferred
inventory position for the broker, to which he aims at reverting. In our model
the broker’s inventory, measured as a portfolio share, ﬂuctuates between  and
23, and is kept within those barriers because of the optimal policies of investors.
However, there is no optimal portfolio for the broker itself. As a consequence,
we do not have problems in matching the lack of empirical mean reversion in
inventories.
Last, in the traditional literature there is a constant fundamental value of
the asset, to which cum-spread prices tend to revert. Also this mean reversion
does not exist in our model, since, as recalled above, pre-spread prices are
geometric Brownian motions, while spreads are constant and time-independent.
This makes our model consistent with the lack of mean reversion on inventories
or broker’s prices, as empirically detected, for instance, by Madhavan and Smidt
(1991) in equity markets.
7.2 Valuation-based literature
This paper allows for competition among brokers, but does not consider the
possibility of trading among investors or inter- broker trading. As concerns the
ﬁrst, we know from the corresponding, representative consumer model (Mer-
ton’s), that there would be no trade at all among such homogeneous investors.
As concerns inter- broker trading, it is excluded because no more than one bro-
ker should exist in our market: rational agents visit only the most risk averse
one, since he is the one whose risk aversion is closer to their own.
For these reasons, i.e., for lack of outside options, the model and its predic-
tions cannot be directly compared with the recent, valuation-based literature in
OTC markets, led by Duﬃe et al. (2005, 2007). However, we share with such
literature the interest in endogenizing market frictions and in studying their
eﬀect on ﬁnancial prices across markets.
Focusing on search costs, Duﬃe et al. (2005) show that bid-ask spreads
are lower if the chance to meet and trade with another agent, i.e. inter-consumer
or inter- broker trade, is easier. This typically happens for "big" traders, who
are able to contact more counterparts. Such result makes their contribution
profoundly diﬀerent from the traditional information-based literature, which
assigns greater spreads to more informed - intuitively, "bigger" - investors. In
our setting, Duﬃe’s et al. results can be reproduced by explicitly modelling
trading costs. We observed that our equilibria produced spreads comonotonic
with external trading costs. Our cross-market predictions then are similar to
the valuation-based ones, i.e. give lower spreads when the access to counter-
parts is easier, for instance because they are "big". In this sense, our cum-
broker equilibrium provides an extremely stylized description of OTC markets,
certainly poorer than the Duﬃe et al. one, but with an explicit, motivating
role for risk aversion22. In addition, since trade frequency is endogenous in our
setting, the traders which deserve smaller spreads are the ones which intervene
22The extension to risk-averse market participants in Duﬃe et al. (2007) introduces a role
for diﬀerential behavior in front of the risky asset. In their case markets participants all
have the same risk attitude, but are heterogeneous in background risk, i.e. in the correlation
between their endowment and the risky asset. As a consequence, a direct comparison with
our diﬀerence in risk attitude does not seem to be straightforward.
24more frequently. This is consistent with them being "big" traders.
8 Summary and conclusions
We characterized equilibrium bid-ask spreads and infrequent trade in a market
populated by two agents, namely an investor and a specialist. In order to reach
our aim, we ﬁrst provided the optimality conditions for market participants.
These conditions determine the equilibrium bid and ask spreads, as well as
the value functions of the agents and intervention barriers - or trade - of the
investor. We veriﬁed that the pre-spread geometric Brownian motion supported
the equilibrium, once endogenous spread were added to it. In equilibrium, trade
is the local time of the Brownian motion at appropriate levels, namely the
trading barriers of the investor. We showed that no equilibrium exists when
both bid and ask prices collapse onto the underlying price, unless the investor is
risk neutral. We proved numerically that the equilibrium exists, at least for some
combinations of risk aversion of its participants, and that its bid ask spreads
and trade frequency, as well as liquidity premium, increase with the diﬀerence
in risk aversions of the specialist and investor. The analysis was conducted both
in the absence and in the presence of external trading costs. Last but not least,
we considered the possibility that heterogeneous brokers compete against each
other and proved that - ex post - a monopolistic specialist will always prevail.
However, his rate of growth of expected utility, all others equal, is the smaller,
the greater is the probability that he attaches to his competitor being able to
attract customers, i.e. to the competitor being less risk averse than himself.
We compared our results with both the inventory and valuation-based liter-
ature on intermediated trade, showing that we share some of the predictions of
the former models, provided that the role of the market-maker risk aversion is
played by the diﬀerence between the counterparts’ risk aversions. We claimed
that we also share with the latter models the better conditions - and higher
trade frequency - reserved to "big" players. The diﬀerence with respect to the
former is that we obtain the results for trade and spreads in equilibrium. the
diﬀerence with respect to the latter is that we have a price for immediacy on
top of external trading costs. This is also a main diﬀerence with respect to the
previous literature on competitive equilibria with transaction costs.
Overall, we consider as our major contribution the possibility of getting en-
dogenous spreads and infrequent trade. Eﬀects on spreads and liquidity premia
are one order of magnitude bigger than their causes. Both with and without
trading costs, intermediation imposes a price for immediacy which is very high
in comparison to its motivation, i.e. diﬀerence in risk aversion, and very sen-
sitive to changes in risk attitudes. Also the departure of the barriers from the
optimal portfolio mix in the absence of costs - no matter how it is measured - is
one order of magnitude bigger than the diﬀerence in risk aversion between mar-
ket participants. Trade is infrequent, less than assumed by partial equilibrium
models, but so as to wash away the continuous readjustments we often assume
in continuous-time Finance. A small heterogeneity in risk aversion (in our ex-
25ample it was 4%) is able to produce high spreads and trade frequency of the
order of months. The result is encouraging, given the low level of heterogeneity
observed in recent empirical work.
Starting from exogenous costs - instead of endogenous spreads - Lo et al.
had already noticed the strong eﬀect of costly trading on prices, and made it a
sign of distinction of their theoretical contribution with respect to the previous
literature. Since they were not working in an intermediated market, they ex-
plained the strong impact of trading costs on prices via high frequency trading
needs and ﬁxed costs. Maintaining the hypothesis of highly frequent trading
needs, we explained ﬁrst-order eﬀects on prices and trade through the existence
of an intermediated market with its price for immediacy23.
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Figure 1: No-transaction cone in the single-agent (lp;up) and equilibrium case
(l;u). In both cases the optimal ratio of risky to riskless assets for the frinction-
















Figure 2: Bid price s, inverse of the ask price q and liquidity premium - computed
as the dierence between the mid price and its frictionless price  = 1=q+s 2 -

















Figure 3: Cone of no-transactions at equilibrium as a function of the dierence
between the investor's and broker's risk aversion, 0  . The cone is written in
terms of the risky-to-riskless-asset ratio  = y=x, which stays between l and u.














Figure 4: Cone of no-transactions at equilibrium as a function of the dierence
between the investor's and broker's risk aversion, 0  . The cone is written in
terms of the ratio between the risky asset and total assets x + y, i.e. =(1 + ),
which stays between l=(1+l) and u=(1+u). Consistently with gures 1 and 3,
the cone contains the frictionless ratio =(1 + ).
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